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Government departments and government commercial enterprises, along with
statutory authorities.constitute a very significant sector in the Australian economy.
Expenditure by all government agencies, i.e. departments, authorities, enterprises,
constitute about 42% of Gross National Product in Australia. The public sector is also
the single largest employer, accounting for the employment of 30% of all wage and
salary earners in Australia (Curran Commission, 1988, p.l). In addition, 50% of
Australia's capital stock is owned by government

~ith

20% of all investment

undertaken by government undertakings (Moore, D., 1988). The role of government
in Australia is therefore considerable.
r

Government agencies and their effects permeate every aspect of our society in
the pursuit of "peace, order and good government" (Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Australia, 5.51). Indeed, there are very few times in our life when
we do not come up against some government agency. Our modem welfare state
increases government intervention as more demands are placed upon government. In
the current period of economic constraint, however, there is a general trend to reduce
the extent of government intervention by privatisation and 'down-sizing' (Curran

,

Report, p.vii). Even allowing for this, it is undeniable that the actions of government
in Australia are remarkable for their depth of penetration and breadth of coverage.
Despite the importance and extent of government intervention in our economy
it has only been over the last few years, really since the late 1970's, that the
importance of better resource management and the role of government accounting in
promoting this has been appreciated. It is now realised that government accounting
can be a very significant means by which resources in the hands of government can be
used in a more efficient, effective and economical manner.

2
AVENUES OF PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTION

The three main avenues of government influence in our economy are through
departments, statutory authorities of a non-commercial nature and commercial
undertakings. While this description of government organisations is adequate for the
purposes of this paper, the practical demands of new government initiatives have
convinced the NSW Government that a more detailed classification was needed.
Accordingly, a Classification of Government Owned Organisations (June 1989) has
been published which lists six (6) categories! on the basis of the level of competition
faced from the private sector and the degree of self-sufficiency from the budget.
Government departments, which are directly under the control of a minister of
state, have the prime function of providing services to the community primarily
centred on "the collection of revenues, the distribution of funds, the enforcement of
laws, ... the administration of expenditure programs aimed at a variety of social and
economic goals" (Exposure Draft 28,1989, p.ll).

A pronounced feature of most

Western countries throughout the 20th century has been the expansion of government
departments and their subsumption of the responsibility for the provision of services
previously provided by the private sector or never previously available to the great
majority>. Few government departments directly charge their customers for services
provided, preferring instead to pay for these services primarily through the levying of
taxation. This is likely to change with the expansion of the 'user pays principle' which
has gained increased favour in the current difficult economic times. Generally,
however, because the public has come to view access to the services provided by
government departments as an almost inalienable right it becomes politically
hazardous to charge people directly for services provided by government departments.
Thus, the introduction of fees is still treated with some caution.

l.

Government service, semi-commercial business, semi-commercial service. commercial business,
commercial service, commercial enterprise.

2.

For example, at Federation in 1901 there were only seven departments in the Commonwealth
Govenunent (7 in NSW). In 1989, this number had increased to 33 departments (26 in NSW).
(See Spann. 1979, pp.53-57 for more detail and NSW Public Sector Management Act 1988,
Schedule 1).
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Statutory authorities are government bodies established by specific acts of
parliament or statutes, their enabling acts. The largest statutory bodies in NSW
include the State Rail Authority, Urban Transit Authority, the Electricity
Commission. At the Federal level Telecom and the Australian National Railways
Commission are two prominent statutory authorities. The individual acts establishing
these authorities state, amongst other things, the precise nature of the activities in
which they are to be engaged which, in comparison to departments, are usually more
narrow in focus, concentrating upon achieving a single main purpose. For example,
the 1987-88 report of the Grain Handling Authority of NSW stated that under Section
12 of the Grain Handling Act 1954 its main powers were to store and handle wheat,
maintain and operate grain storages and advise the Minister on matters affecting the
grain industry. Statutory authorities differ from govemment departments therefore, in
both the nature of their birth (by statute) and by the extent of their activities. While
their mandates may be more circumscribed, the economic impact of statutory
authorities rivals that of departments. For example, in NSW it has been estimated that
statutory authorities control $33.7 billion in assets compared to $31 billion for
departments (Curran Report, p.44). They are similar to departments in that the
majority operate as monopolies in their market or are by far the major player.
The growth of statutory authorities has been even more remarkable than that
of departments. The Australian Auditor-General in his 1987 report counted 105
authorities whose accounts were audited by the Australian Audit Office (AAO)
(Annual Report of the AAO 1986-87, p.21). This extension of government influence
via statutory authorities has, however, been seriously questioned. In particular, the
substitution of a government organisation for private sector involvement has been
severely criticised (Curran Report, p.vi). Indeed, recent moves in both Australia and
overseas for government to withdraw from activities which could be taken over by
private interests is a reflection of the belief that government should be rolled back and
that less government is better government.
The Commonwealth government has, like the NSW Government,
unambiguously declared its aversion to the proliferation of authorities and indicated
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that it intended to "make sparing use of the statutory authority form of administration"
(Policy Guidelines for Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government
Business Enterprises, 1987, p.7). A major objection to the unrestrained growth and
presence of statutory authorities expressed in the Policy Guidelines was the
"unnecessary fragmentation of the machinery of government" and accompanying
accountability problems which seemed unavoidable in the past as the number of
statutory authorities grew (p.7).
The most distinguishing features of government commercial enterprises is the
competition they face with private firms and that they are to be wholly self-supporting
from revenue earned by their operations. It is in this area of government influence
that the move towards privatisation is strongest, e.g. Qantas, Australian Airlines. The
government may enter the market as a competitor for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is the desire to elevate the level of competition which may otherwise
exist. Further, in a country the size of Australia with a very small and dispersed
population, the level of initial and continuing investment in the provision of some
goods and services may be prohibitive for a private finn. Also, the secure hold of the
market by the existing films may dissuade new firms entering the market (See,
Classification and Control of State Organisations, June 1989, pp.9-11).
Given the very intense competitive environment faced by government
commercial enterprises special conditions governing their operations and
accountability necessarily apply. In particular, the competitive situation of these
bodies whereby confidentiality is essential creates special requirements for financial
accounting and reporting.
Irrespective of the source of funding, mission or nature of operations all
government agencies are accountable to Parliament. Departments are almost entirely
dependent upon Parliament for annual funding through the process of budgetary
appropriations while statutory authorities may be, in part, dependent upon Parliament
for fmancial sustenance. Commercial enterprises, which are not supported by annual
Parliamentary appropriations are still accountable to Parliament because Parliament is
either the major shareholder or provided the original capital.

II

I

j
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Constitutional Developments
As a British colony in the 19th century, government accounting was
transplanted almost without alteration from the United Kingdom (UK). The public
sector accounting which came to Australia, initially with the First Fleet, was the
culmination of centuries of development in the UK. Possibly the most significant
event in the modern evolution of government accounting in the UK was the English
Revolution of 1688 and the revolutionary settlement of 1689 for the settlement onceand-for-all affirmed the supremacy of Parliament in all matters but most importantly
it settled that Parliament had the right to raise revenue and only Parliament had the
authority to determine the use of the revenue so raised.
Parliament had long been recognised in England as the supreme law making
body although much of the constitutional fighting in the 17th century, in particular the
Civil War, concerned the rights and privileges of Parliament as questioned by the
monarchy. Most frequently challenged were Parliament's revenue powers. Real
power in government is based upon money: whoever controls the fmances of the
country will usually have unassailable power. This power was derived from the
ability to control the raising of an army and to direct its actions. Consequently, after
the Revolution in 1689, Parliament wanted to ensure that it could not be threatened by
the powerful army of the ruling monarch. If Parliament controlled the raising and
dispensing of fmance it would therefore also control the King's military might armies must be paid, fed, equipped and clothed.
While Parliament was supreme in financial control Parliament did not, and
still does not, spend the money raised through its legislative authority. Instead, the
elected government of the day which comprises the executive, i.e. Prime Minister,
Cabinet Ministers and Departments, is responsible for deciding how the money is
spent. Before the executive can get the money it needs from Parliament, which has
exclusive revenue raising powers, it must present a list of reasons why it requires the
money. This demand on Parliament is the budget.

6
Budgetary Appropriation
In today's political environment where government is dominated by party
politics rejection of executive proposals for expenditure is not very common. The
Executive party, after all, also constitutes the majority in the legislature's lower house,
the House of Representatives (Federal), from which all money legislation must
originate as established in s.53 of the Constitution
"Proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys, or
imposing taxation shall not originate in the Senate."
The NSW Constitution Act 1902 also gives the lower house the sole
prerogative to originate money bills (S.5).
The financial plans of the executive can be delayed by the Upper House only
temporarily. In the case of the Commonwealth Government, the Constitution
provides that the Senate has the right to review legislation involving the raising of
revenue or its expenditure but can only return suggestions for any changes. The
government of the day is free to accept or disregard the suggestions and to proceed
without any further reference to the Senate (S.53). (NSW, S.5A of the Constitution
Act 1902) .
Once the Executive's budget is finalised it will then be presented to Parliament
for debate. The nature of the debate in the past has traditionally been very much on
party lines rather than a detailed examination of the merit of the proposals for
expenditure and revenue raising. Ultimately, the budget is approved by Parliament
which then legislates for the raising of the necessary revenue to meet the Executive's
(the Government's) budget objectives. The Appropriation Acts are passed for this
purpose each year. In the federal sphere, there are two main Appropriation Acts,
which, following the detail of the budget, authorise money to be spent according to
the government's approved programme. The Treasury, state and federal, is
responsible for issuing money to the government. It is at this point in the
Constitutional arrangement of Commonwealth and State fmances that the accounting
practices of the public sector become important.

1_
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Institutional Framework of Accounting and Financial Control
In Westminster governments the system of budgets and appropriation, covered
briefly already, is at the very heart of parliamentary financial control. Though these
mechanisms Parliament is able to provide a partial check on the activities of the
executive. To ensure that resources are used as approved by Parliament, and thereby
to ensure a measure of financial control of the executive, Parliament must rely upon
the assistance of various government bodies. Most important in assisting the
Commonwealth and NSW Parliaments with their financial powers and responsibilities
is the Treasury.
The Treasury is probably the most important department of general government.
Through the Treasurer, the Treasury is responsible for advising the government on
major macroeconomic matters. A major role of the Commonwealth Treasury is the
responsibility for the collection of money through various agencies such as the Tax
Office. In NSW, the Treasury has been reorganised (1988) into two sections: the
Office of Financial Management and the Office of State Revenue. The Office of
State Revenue is exclusively concerned with raising state revenue (NSW Treasury
Annual Report 1987-88). The Office of Financial Management is primarily
responsible for advising the government on budgetary and other financial issues as
well as encouraging efficient and effective management in the public sector. As part
of its management improvement role the Office of Financial Management has very
extensive responsibilities associated with public sector accounting. Not only is the
Office responsible for administering the States "accounting systems, practices and
procedures", which includes surveillance of the Annual Reports Acts covering
departments (1985) and statutory authorities (1984), it is also expected to take a
proactive stance in accounting improvement. Increasingly important also is the
review and formulation of accounting standards applicable to the public sector
(Annual Report of the Treasury, 1987-88, p.ll).
Primarily responsible for the Commonwealth's accounting functions and
management advice is the Department of Finance. The Commonwealth Department
of Finance was established by the Fraser Government in 1976 by segregating some of
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the Treasury's functions. The major function of the Department of Finance is to
advise the Treasury and the Government in relation to the financial administration and
management of government agencies. This contrasts with Treasury responsibilities
which are broader in scope. The major responsibilities of the Department of Finance
are:
(i)

(ii)

the preparation of Appropriation Bills
the review of departmental expenditure with the view to making
recommendations for improved management. The recently introduced
Financial Management Improvement Programme has been an important
development in this area.

(iii)

general oversight of the fmances of departments which acquire funds
from the budget.

(iv)

to evaluate the effectiveness of various executive programmes. To
assist the executive in its evaluation the Department of Finance is
responsible for developing statements of objectives for government
departments and for establishing measures of attainment of objectives.

(v)
(vi)

supervision of the financial management of statutory authorities.
development of accounting and financial systems. (Armual Report,
Department of Finance, 1987-88).

Thus the Treasury is more concerned with the raising of revenue and overall
economic performance of the country while the Department of Finance is more
concemed with the role of individual government agencies as they seek to meet
government objectives in the management of the economy.
In NSW the Department of Finance was abolished in 1988 and most of its
functions given to the Premier's Office and the Treasury. Thus in NSW, Treasury
functions are broader than at the Commonwealth level although prime concerns are
very much the same.
Checks on the level and direction of spending only provide a partial control
over the executive. In addition, only a small percentage of government expenditure
comes up for annual approval by Parliament. The great majority of expenditure is
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committed by standing arrangements, e.g. Department of Social Security, or is largely
non-discretionary as in the case of wages and salaries. Further, spending by statutory
authorities and conunercial enterprises is primarily outside the budgetary control of
Parliament. As a consequence of the impact of these trends on Parliamentary scrutiny
and increasing concern for wise management of public sector resources, the review of
expenditure on behalf of Parliament has assumed greater importance. Of particular
significance are the investigations of the Auditor-General and Parliamentary
Committees.
Modem public sector auditing powers in Australia are derived from the 1866
British Audit Act but more specifically the 1901 Audit Act for the Commonwealth
and in NSW it is the Public Finance and Audit Act of 1983. At both Federal and State
levels the Auditor-General is not a public servant under the control of a public service
board but is appointed by the Governor-General (or Governor) and is answerable only
to Parliament (Audit Act 1901, S. 3). The role of the Auditor-General has been to
audit the accounts of all government departments and also statutory authorities,
although this has been modified recently. In the case of statutory authorities, at the
Commonwealth level, the Audit Act now allows some authorities, mainly statutory
marketing authorities, to contract their external audit with a private firm. In addition,
govenunent commercial enterprises are allowed to seek the services of private
auditors (S.63MA, S.63MB). This trend has not been received well by the AuditorGeneral of the Commonwealth who sees it as an erosion of the accountability of these
bodies to Parliament (Annual Report of the AAO, 1987, p.9; 1988, p.2).
A major recommendation of Report 296 from the Joint Committee of Public
Accounts stipulated that the Auditor-General of the Commonwealth should have, if
not the sole responsibility for carrying out all audits, the power to regulate the access
of statutory authorities to the services of private auditors. At the moment the sole
check of the Auditor-General on the use of private auditors is on the quality of their
reports (S.63MB). Private auditors are used by statutory authorities in NSW,
although as yet no departments fall in this category, but only with the permission of
the NSW Auditor-General (Public Finance and Audit Act, 1983, S.35(1». While only
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about 15% of all statutory authority audits are conducted with the assistance of
private sector auditors, and mainly concentrated on County Councils and Area Health
Boards, it is apparent that public sector audit work will become increasingly
important to private firms, The recently legislated State Owned Corporations Act,
1989 also promises to expand public sector involvement in external audit.
Traditionally the audit task has been mainly concerned with ensuring, on
behalf of Parliament, that money appropriated by Parliament to departments had been
used as authorised. Today, however, while regularity audits still account for most of
the work of the Auditors-General, 72% of the resources of the Conunonwealth
Auditor-General in 1986-87, the great majority of the time and effort is occupied in
statutory authorities and public sector enterprises. In 1986-87, 12% of the
Commonwealth Auditor-General's resources were devoted to regulatory audits in
departments and 60% to statutory authorities and government enterprises. This is
both a reflection of recent legislative changes to reporting requirements for statutory
authorities, to be discussed below, and also a recognition of the importance of
statutory authorities as instruments of government social and economic policy.
For the Commonwealth Auditor-General a major change in audit
responsibilities occurred in 1979 when the Audit Act (190 I) was amended to extend
the Auditor-General's mandate to include performance auditing. The Auditor-General
has maintained that limited scope performance audits, designated as project audits,
were carried out prior to 1979 under section 54 of the Audit Act. The addition of
section 48 allowed for more detailed performance audits called efficiency audits.
Section 48 also improved Parliamentary surveillance by requiring a report of all
efficiency audits be presented to Parliament (S.48F), a feature absent for performance
audits carried out under S.54.
Originally it was envisaged that efficiency auditing would account for fifty
percent of audit effort by the Commonwealth Auditor-General. However, due to
resource constraints, the importance of efficiency auditing, has continued to fall to a
low of 18% of audit resources in 1986-87, a drop of 10% on the previous year.
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Financial audits by the Commonwealth Auditor-General directed towards
legality and regularity are mandatory (SAI(I), 41(A» and therefore there is no room
to alter the intensity of audit. Efficiency audits (and project audits) are, however, at
the discretion of the Auditor-General who "may carry out, at such intervals as he
thinks fit, an efficiency audit of all or any (agencies) .." (SA8e). The efficiency audit
function therefore carries the brunt of resource limitations imposed on the AuditorGeneral. So fragile would it seem the existence of efficiency auditing in times of
resource constraint that the Auditor-General expressed concern that "the continued
development of this important element of the public sector audit function (would be
jeopardised)" (AAO Annual Report, 1986-87, pA). The impact ofresource
constraints on the performance of efficiency audits was a major concern of the JCPA
in its Report 296 (Recommendations 13-18).
Responsibility for efficiency reviews in NSW is the province of the Office of
Public Management (OPM) within the Premier's Department. The NSW AuditorGeneral's duties continue to reside in traditional audits. The purpose of the aPM is to
promote efficient management within the NSW public sector. While there are not
explicit statutory provisions governing the conduct of efficiency reviews, the work of
the OPM is generally regulated by sections 48 and 49 of the Public Sector
Management Act (1988). Section 48 establishes that a Minister may call for a review
of a department's performance. or any part of its operations. Unlike the efficiency
audits at the Commonwealth level, no report need be made to Parliament of the
findings of a review carried out by the OPM (SA9).
The most important financial review committee for both the Commonwealth
and NSW which assists Parliament to ensure government agencies are made
financially accountable is the Public Accounts Committee. The Conunonwealth
Committee is called the Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA), because its
members are drawn from both Houses of Parliament. The main purpose of this very
important review committee, appointed under the Public Accounts Committee Act
1951, is to examine the audit reports of the Auditor-General but more particularly to
investigate any matters referred to it by the Auditor-General (S.8(1». This
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Committee is a statutory committee of Parliament and as such will report to
Parliament any serious deficiencies exposed in the accounts by the Auditor-General or
any recommendations that will improve the accounts (S.8(l)(b)(c». It is through this
Committee that Parliament is able to review the performance of government via the
annual accounts as audited by the Auditor-General. The work of the Committee can
also be prompted by requests directly from Parliament (S.8(1)(d». Without this
Committee it is doubtful whether Parliament would have the time, expertise or even
interest to examine all accounts and Auditor-General recommendations.
To assist the JCPA the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public
Administration, and its twin Committee in the House of Representatives, is
empowered to oversee and promote the public accountability of "statutory authorities,
non-statutory bodies, companies ... and the Central Administration of the Australian
Government" (Department of the Senate, Arumal Report 1988-89, p.46). The broader
mandate and statutory base of the JCP A ensure its dominant role in financial review.
The NSW PAC, whose powers and functions are determined by Part IV of the
Public Finance and Audit Act (983), has slightly different powers to the JCPA and is
drawn only from the Legislative Assembly. The review functions are, however, very
similar to that of the JCP A.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

To be accountable means there is an obligation to answer for ones actions and
decisions: there is an agent-principal relationship with one agency (or person) acting
on behalf of another and therefore answerable to the principal. In the case of
government it is the executive operating under the authority of Parliament. In the
public sector accountability is interpreted very broadly but essentially two
accountability requirements have been imposed on government agencies: fiduciary
and management.
Fiduciary accountability, or concern for the regularity and legality of
expenditures has been the traditional accountability concern of Parliament. The
prudent management of public sector resources has, however, only recently received
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legislative backing. Good management requires resources to be used efficiently,
economically and effectively. Efficiency refers to the cost of obtaining a particular
output. Efficiency is achieved if the same outputs can be achieved with a reduction in
the level of resources used to accomplish the same output or additional outputs for the
same resources previously used. Efficiency could also be seen in terms of gaining a
proportionately greater increase in output for a given increase in input. Economy is
the easiest to verify for it concerns the acquisition of assets and the carrying out of
operations for the lowest cost commensurate with quality.
Despite the importance of eliminating waste (improving efficiency) and
encouraging economy these two goals will frequently have to take second place. The
public may want the govenunent to operate in an efficient and economic marmer but
not at the expense of reduced services. Thus the most contentious element of
management or performance accountability is effectiveness. Society primarily exists
to meet collective needs, not to be efficient. Efficiency may assist in the attairunent
of the goals pursued by society but it is not an end in itself (Report of Standing
Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Review of the Efficiency Scrutiny
Program. April 1989, p.18). The Commonwealth Auditor-General differentiates
between administrative effectiveness and policy effectiveness. He argues that his
mandate only extends to the former, an assessment of the results of administrative
decisions taken within auditee agencies. Policy effectiveness is the ultimate level of
accountability because it is concerned with whether the goals of the government have
been achieved. It requires the comparison of achievements with expectations and
questioning the merits of existing policy. Policy effectiveness is thus a highly
charged political issue. Consequently, effectiveness evaluations are the function of
the NSW Premier's Department or the Prime Minister.
Departmental secretaries, also known as Directors, Director-General, are
accountable for the regularity and legality, efficiency and economy of their operations
to their Minister (NSW. Public Finance and Audit Act, 1983, SA5C, D, Public Sector
Management Act, 1988, S.11; Commonwealth, Audit Act 1901, Ss.38-45B). The
Minister in tum is answerable to Parliament for the management of a department
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(e.g. in NSW, Public Sector Management Act, 1988, S.43). Traditionally the head of
government departments has been a careerist in government administration, not a
political appointee. They were paid to act in a very limited way as custodians of
public resources. In NSW the Greiner Government announced, however, that the
procedure for the appointment of departmental heads and other senior officers would
change as would expectations regarding their performance. Senior executive
appointments are now to be on a contract basis but at the same time it was emphasised
that appointment would be securely based on merit and not political sympathies.
This change in appointment criteria reflects the expanded accountability
demands now placed upon departments and departmental heads. The Public Sector
and Management Act 1988 makes it incumbent on NSW departmental heads to be
responsible for "the general conduct and the effective, efficient and economical
management of the functions and activities of the Department" (S.ll). Increases in
salaries to meet the competition for managers in the private sector gives a very high
profile to the government's determination to expand the sphere of accountability.
Improvements to the reporting requirements of Commonwealth departments also
indicates a determination to improve the accountability and fmancial management of
departments (see Financial Statements Guidelines for Departmental Secretaries, June
1989, pp.l,2).
Assessment of management performance in Departments is fraught with
problems. Most troublesome is a review of management efficiency. To measure the
efficiency of a department, or any agency, requires measures of performance and
clarification of objectives. For some departments this dual requirement may pose few
difficulties, for others solution of these problems is very elusive. Departments
frequently provide services to the community, services which may be difficult to
quantify and therefore measure, e.g. education. To overcome this it has been
suggested that standards of efficiency could be established by comparing performance
between similar institutions. However, at govemment level this may not be possible
or feasible given the uniqueness of most departments. Comparison between countries
is also fraught with difficulties. Unlike private sector organisations, or public sector
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firms competing in the open market, where the 'bottom line' or profit figure is taken as
an indication of the efficiency of operations, departmental performance is not able to
be encapsulated in one sununary figure. The Department of Finance
(Conunonwealth) recognises that assessment of the efficiency for departments needs
to rely instead on several dimensions of performance. To this end the Department of
Finance has established a unit to assist departments in developing performance
measures.
Accountability standards for statutory authorities and conunercial enterprises
are largely similar and thus will be treated together. All statutory authorities, and
ultimately all commercial enterprises are answerable to a Minister. For statutory
authorities this is shown in the enabling legislation. Consistent with the drive for
wider accountability in departments, both the Commonwealth and NSW Governments
have clearly indicated their determination to make management in statutory
authorities and commercial undertakings answerable for their performance. Most are
now required to meet very specific performance targets, including return on capital
employed and profit levels. This particularly applies to agencies engaged in market
transactions as trading enterprises. The present NSW Government, in a paper
produced very early in their term of office, made their concern for 'productive
efficiency' very clear, accepting that "performance can only be regarded as
satisfactory when a GTE has used resources at least as efficiently as its competitors"
(A Policy Framework for Improving the Perfonnance of Government Trading
Enterprises, September 1988, p.16).
To bolster the government's determination to make statutory authorities more
accountable for their activities, whether engaged in trading or not, the NSW
government has also reinforced the importance of the Annual Reports (Statutory
Bodies) Act 1984 and associated regulations (Regulation, 1985) (see Annual
Reporting by Statutory Bodies: Information on the Responsibility of Members of
Boards, NSW Treasury, December 1987). Apart from disclosure of essential
'housekeeping' matters such s the enabling legislation of the authority and its location
the 1984 Act and associated regulations require considerable management detail. In
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particular there must appear in the annual report "qualitative and quantitative
measures and indicators of performance showing the level of efficiency and
effectiveness" (Regulation 4(h)(ia».
The general, as well as specific, thrust of the Policy Guidelines for
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government Business Enterprises (October
1987) is for greater accountability of non-departmental agencies and Government
"commitment to achieving the highest levels of operational and fmancial efficiency in
Commonwealth business enterprises" (Policy Guidelines, p. 1). The addition, in
1979, of section 48 to the Audit Act 1901 provided very stem expression of the
governments intention to make non-departmental agencies answerable for the wise
stewardship of resources under their control.
THE MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

In order to ensure the broadened, and traditional, accountability concerns of
Parliament are met extensive changes have been introduced at both the
Commonwealth and State levels. Most, if not all, these changes have been introduced
in the last 5 years. While the winds of change took too long to reach an effective
force the pace of change reflects an unflagging zeal and commitment on behalf of
governments to push forward.
Outstanding developments in public sector accountability have occurred in:
accounting procedures and reporting, the budget cycle, financial and asset
management, external and internal audit and in management reviews. Attention will
be restricted for the purposes of this paper to the budget and changes to reporting
mechanisms. Innovations in extemal audit and management reviews have already
been referred to earlier. Because changes in budget requirements have had a far
reaching impact on most other mechanisms of accountability they will be addressed
firstly.
Budget Reforms
The Hawke Labor Govenunent made the issue of budget reform the
centrepiece of its package of fmancial reforms when it published in Apri11984,
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Budget Reform: A Statement of the Government's Achievements and Intentions in
Reforming Australian Financial Administration. The main themes of its reform
proposals were to streamline budget decision making, improve "the information base
and the process for parliamentary and public scrutiny of the budget" and "upgrading
the fmancial management of programs in Government agencies" (Budget Reform,
p.iii). These reforms, it was argued, would contribute to a more responsive, efficient
and accountable government.
Standing as the keystone to the Commonwealth's reforms is program
budgeting for departments. Traditionally budgets were formulated on the basis of
items or subjects of expenditure, mainly departmental salaries and administrative
expenses. No attempt was made to categorise expenditure according to expected
achievements or programs. Dissatisfaction with the information content of the lineitem budget finally proved sufficient in the mid-1980's to see it gradually replaced at
both State (NSW) and Federal levels with the program format. Since 1986-87 all
NSW departments have been required to use the program format, after tentative
introduction from 1984 in increasing numbers of departments. All Commonwealth
departments now must use programs as the basis of their budget requests.
Program budgeting sets out executive outlays according to broad functions,
general programs and specific activities. Activities are placed within a hierarchical
structure of programs, each related to a specific objective. Once the programs have
been identified major costs must be established. Thus, the major feature and strength
of program budgeting over line-item budgeting is its ability to compare program
accomplishments with previously detennined objectives. Program budgeting thereby
encourages efficient administration, if for nothing else than the searching reviews
required to form program statements and objectives. By requiring the specification of
objectives there also occurs better identification of managers responsible for program
accomplishments. This, of course, pre-supposes improved information flows to meet
the performance measurement demands of program budgeting.
Program budgeting in NSW is organised around two hierarchies of programs.
One hierarchy is goal oriented with programs identified in very broad terms, e.g. law
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and order. The main advantage of this hierarchy is it provides a good picture of total
policy costs. The second format, which is the one used for budgets and for
departmental reporting, centres on ministerial groupings of programs then
organisational units, programs and activities. Diagram 1 below illustrates both
structures.

Diagram 1
Organisational
Classification

Objectives
Classification
(Goal Oriented)

I

I

Minister

Policy Area

Organi.JiOnal
Unit (Department,
Authority)

I

Program Area

Policy Sector

Program

I

Activity
Thus, through the provision of information on a program basis, attention to
policies and specific activities necessary to fulfIl policy objectives is elevated,
resources and costs needed are highlighted and measures to evaluate output are
developed. Parliament, therefore, is better able to assess departmental needs and
performance. It also encourages continuous assessment by departments and facilitates
systematic scrutiny of departments (Report of the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Expenditure, Parliament and Public Expenditure, February 1979). For
these advantages to be met reporting procedures by departments had to change.
These changes occurred not in isolation but in concert with a revolution in public
sector accounting affecting all agencies.
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Public Sector Accounts
Accounts produced at State and Federal levels can be categorised in three
main groupings: central, departmental and those of statutory authorities and
commercial undertakings.
As previously established,govemrnent expenditure is authorised by Parliament
on the basis of budget submissions from departments. To enable Parliament at a later
date to check that its wishes were followed by the executive then reports emanating
from the executive showing actual expenditures should be constructed to allow
comparisons with allowable expenditure. Consequently, in concert with the changes
to budget format, departmental fmancial reports must now follow the program format
of the budget. NSW legislation demands that "financial statements ... shall consist of
- i) a statement of receipts and payments of public money ... in relation to such items
'" as may be prescribed." (Public Finance and Audit Act, 1983, S.45E(I)(a)). The
items referred to are the programs identified in the budget. Commonwealth
Departments must also present accounts which follow the mode of Parliamentary
expenditure approval (Audit Act 1901, S.50(2); Commonwealth, Budget Paper No.3,
Portfolio Program Estimates).
Like the budget, departmental accounts show almost exclusively cash
movements. Cash accounting, which has been the basis of government accounting in
Westminster democracies, involves recording only the amounts of cash actually spent
in the current financial year and the amount of cash received in the same period.
Even though the accounts of NSW departments are not on an accrual basis some
exceptions to cash entries are permitted. Accrued salaries and wages are allowed to
be included in the accounts and from the Appropriation Act 1986 the cost of goods
and services which may have been expected to be paid for by 30 June can be
transferred from the Consolidated Fund account, an account which must end the year
with a zero balance, to the Special Deposits account thus effectively allowing the
carry-over of these amounts to the next budget period. (Report of NSW AuditorGeneral, 1986-87, Part I, p.l3; For examples see the Department ofIndustrial
Relations and Employment Annual Report 1986-87, note 14, p.138; note 2 p.134;
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note 9, p.B?). Introduction of full accrual accounting in departments is to occur in
the near future in NSW. Currently a unit has been established in the Treasury to
ensure the smooth implementation of accrual accounting.
By virtue of the powers conferred upon the Cabinet by S.25 of the Public
Service Act the Hawke Government issued very modest reporting guidelines for
Corrunonwealth departments in 1982, which were subsequently expanded in 1986.
The main aim envisaged for the annual financial statements was to ensure that
Parliament was better informed of the activities of departments and that information
about these activities be more widely disseminated. Detailed explication of financial
statements as part of the annual reporting requirements for departments have been
reviewed recently and published as Financial Statement Guidelines for Departmental
Secretaries (June 1989). Emphasis is still on cash statements, although the Guidelines
make it clear that if improved accountability and financial management are to be
promoted then annual fmancial reports require "information which goes beyond that
which has been provided by traditional cash accounting" (p.2). Therefore a good deal
of information must be provided, in supplementary information, on assets and
liabilities. One notable exception is the cost ofland and buildings (p.18). There is,
however, "no intention to move to full accrual accounting at this time" (p.2).
Amendments in 1985 to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 have made all departmental
guidelines compulsory minimum standards (S.34C).
Annual reports, incorporating financial statements, have been mandatory for
NSW departments since 1985-86. The Annual Reports (Departments) Act, 1985 has
a similar objective to that of the Commonwealth departmental guidelines and has
many conunon provisions, including disclosure of information on assets.
Both federal and state governments see the form and content of fmancial
statements as a major factor in changing the approach to the management of public
sector resources. In particular, the use of accrual accounting in non-budget agencies
is seen as crucial to engendering the efficient and effective use of resources.P
Commonwealth statutory authorities must prepare accounts in accordance with "the
3.

See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the merits of accrual accounting.
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accounting principles generally applied in commercial practice" (Audit Act 1901,
S.63F; Guidelines for the Fonn and Standard of Financial Statements of
Commonwealth Undertakings, p.2) while in NSW statutory authorities are directed to
prepare their statements on "an accrual accounting basis" (Public Finance and Audit
Act, 1983, S.41B(1)(b»4. In the case of the Commonwealth the legislation does not
detail the contents of the statements. Instead, statement contents are indicated
through the use of guidelines published by the Department of Finance. The
Guidelines for the Fonn and Standard of Financial Statements of Commonwealth
Undertakings, which were originally issued in 1983 with subsequent revisions
appearing up to June 1989, require the disclosure of fmancial information which will
allow the user to establish: "revenues and costs of operations", "net resources ...
currently devoted to its activities", solvency and "change in the level of net resources"
(paragraph 3). Commonwealth authorities have argued that using guidelines as
opposed to legislation to detail reporting requirements allows greater flexibility;
changes can be brought about more quickly and the relative ease with which changes
can be made tends to encourage improvement. Despite these avowed advantages
NSW has chosen to incorporate fmancial reporting provisions for non-departmental
agencies in the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, S.41B.
Public sector undertakings at both state and federal levels operating as a
company must report on their operations in accordance with the provisions of the
relevant Company Code. The reports instead of going to a body of individual
shareholders are foremost for Parliamentary consumption through the relevant
Minister.
CONCLUSION

The accountability of government agencies to Parliament is an essential
ingredient to a strong Westminster democracy. Parliament must be able to ensure, as
either the main source of sustenance for departments or the sponsor for statutory
authorities and public sector companies, that the resources it provides are used wisely
and as directed.
4.

Section 41B(2) does allow exceptions with Treasury approval.
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The extreme demands placed on Parliament's time and resources prevent
direct monitoring of resource usage. Instead Parliament is forced to rely upon the
work of review bodies to draw to Parliament's attention matters of concern.
Particularly important in this role are the Public Accounts Committee and the
Auditor-General.
The effectiveness of review is, in large measure, dependent on the information
available to the reviewing body. In the past, the worth of review procedures had been
sorely limited because information provided by accountable bodies has been narrowly
focused and directed. Especially significant was the obsessive concern with inputs.
Surveillance under these circumstances was seriously circumscribed. The eighties
with its economic pressures on governments, forced Parliament to expand its
performance demands on accountable agencies. Accompanying this was an
expansion of Parliament's information net to include questions of efficiency and
economy. Thus the eighties have seen the acceptance by Parliament of the need for
output measures to assess performance and a preference for more sophisticated
accounting systems; more particularly accrual accounting.
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